Postpandemic Sentinel Surveillance of Respiratory Diseases in the Context of the World Health Organization Mosaic Framework: Protocol for a Development and Evaluation Study Involving the English Primary Care Network 2023-2024.

BACKGROUND: Prepandemic sentinel surveillance focused on improved management of winter pressures, with influenza-like illness (ILI) being the key clinical indicator. The World Health Organization (WHO) global standards for influenza surveillance include monitoring acute respiratory infection (ARI) and ILI. The WHO's mosaic framework recommends that the surveillance strategies of countries include the virological monitoring of respiratory viruses with pandemic potential such as influenza. The Oxford-Royal College of General Practitioner Research and Surveillance Centre (RSC) in collaboration with the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has provided sentinel surveillance since 1967, including virology since 1993. OBJECTIVE: We aim to describe the RSC's plans for sentinel surveillance in the 2023-2024 season and evaluate these plans against the WHO mosaic framework. METHODS: Our approach, which includes patient and public involvement, contributes to surveillance objectives across all 3 domains of the mosaic framework. We will generate an ARI phenotype to enable reporting of this indicator in addition to ILI. These data will support UKHSA's sentinel surveillance, including vaccine effectiveness and burden of disease studies. The panel of virology tests analyzed in UKHSA's reference laboratory will remain unchanged, with additional plans for point-of-care testing, pneumococcus testing, and asymptomatic screening. Our sampling framework for serological surveillance will provide greater representativeness and more samples from younger people. We will create a biomedical resource that enables linkage between clinical data held in the RSC and virology data, including sequencing data, held by the UKHSA. We describe the governance framework for the RSC. RESULTS: We are co-designing our communication about data sharing and sampling, contextualized by the mosaic framework, with national and general practice patient and public involvement groups. We present our ARI digital phenotype and the key data RSC network members are requested to include in computerized medical records. We will share data with the UKHSA to report vaccine effectiveness for COVID-19 and influenza, assess the disease burden of respiratory syncytial virus, and perform syndromic surveillance. Virological surveillance will include COVID-19, influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and other common respiratory viruses. We plan to pilot point-of-care testing for group A streptococcus, urine tests for pneumococcus, and asymptomatic testing. We will integrate test requests and results with the laboratory-computerized medical record system. A biomedical resource will enable research linking clinical data to virology data. The legal basis for the RSC's pseudonymized data extract is The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, and all nonsurveillance uses require research ethics approval. CONCLUSIONS: The RSC extended its surveillance activities to meet more but not all of the mosaic framework's objectives. We have introduced an ARI indicator. We seek to expand our surveillance scope and could do more around transmissibility and the benefits and risks of nonvaccine therapies.

Diagnostic accuracy of a point-of-care antigen test for SARS-CoV-2 and influenza in a primary care population (RAPTOR-C19).

OBJECTIVES: Limited evidence exists for the diagnostic performance of point-of-care tests for SARS-CoV-2 and influenza in community healthcare. We carried out a prospective diagnostic accuracy study of the LumiraDx™ SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A or B assay in primary care. METHODS: Total of 913 adults and children with symptoms of current SARS-CoV-2 infection were recruited from 18 UK primary care practices during a period when Omicron was the predominant COVID variant of concern (June 2022 to December 2022). Trained health care staff performed the index test, with diagnostic accuracy parameters estimated for SARS-CoV-2 and influenza against real-time reverse-transcription PCR (rtRT-PCR). RESULTS: 151/887 participants were SARS-CoV-2 rtRT-PCR positive, 109 positive for Influenza A, 6 for Influenza B. Index test sensitivity for SARS-CoV-2 was 80.8% (122 of the 151, 95% CI, 73.6-86.7%) and specificity 98.9% (728 of the 736, 95% CI, 97.9-99.5%). For influenza A, sensitivity was 61.5% (67 of the 109, 95% CI, 51.7-70.6%) and specificity 99.4% (771 of the 776, 95% CI, 98.5-99.8%). Sensitivity to detect SARS-CoV-2 and influenza dropped sharply at rtRT-PCR cycle thresholds (Ct) > 30. DISCUSSIONS: The LumiraDx™ SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A/B assay had moderate sensitivity for SARS-CoV-2 in symptomatic patients in primary care, with lower performance with high rtRT-PCR Ct. Negative results in this patient group cannot definitively rule out SARS-CoV-2 or influenza.

Monitoring the emergence of community transmission of influenza A/H1N1 2009 in England: a cross sectional opportunistic survey of self sampled telephone callers to NHS Direct.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate ascertainment of the onset of community transmission of influenza A/H1N1 2009 (swine flu) in England during the earliest phase of the epidemic through comparing data from two surveillance systems. DESIGN: Cross sectional opportunistic survey. STUDY SAMPLES: Results from self samples by consenting patients who had called the NHS Direct telephone health line with cold or flu symptoms, or both, and results from Health Protection Agency (HPA) regional microbiology laboratories on patients tested according to the clinical algorithm for the management of suspected cases of swine flu. SETTING: Six regions of England between 24 May and 30 June 2009. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Proportion of specimens with laboratory evidence of influenza A/H1N1 2009. RESULTS: Influenza A/H1N1 2009 infections were detected in 91 (7%) of the 1385 self sampled specimens tested. In addition, eight instances of influenza A/H3 infection and two cases of influenza B infection were detected. The weekly rate of change in the proportions of infected individuals according to self obtained samples closely matched the rate of increase in the proportions of infected people reported by HPA regional laboratories. Comparing the data from both systems showed that local community transmission was occurring in London and the West Midlands once HPA regional laboratories began detecting 100 or more influenza A/H1N1 2009 infections, or a proportion positive of over 20% of those tested, each week. CONCLUSIONS: Trends in the proportion of patients with influenza A/H1N1 2009 across regions detected through clinical management were mirrored by the proportion of NHS Direct callers with laboratory confirmed infection. The initial concern that information from HPA regional laboratory reports would be too limited because it was based on testing patients with either travel associated risk or who were contacts of other influenza cases was unfounded. Reports from HPA regional laboratories could be used to recognise the extent to which local community transmission was occurring.